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Abstract 
While it is generally recognized that electoral competition can have a major influence 
on public spending decisions, there has been little effort to consider whether the 
move to multiparty elections in African countries in recent years has led to a 
redistribution of public expenditures between social groups. In this paper I develop a 
hypothesis, illustrated with a simple game-theoretic model, which suggests that the 
need to obtain an electoral majority may have prompted African governments to 
devote greater resources to primary schools. I test this proposition using panel data 
on electoral competition and education spending in thirty-five African countries over 
the period 1981-1996. The results show that democratization has indeed been 
associated with greater spending on primary schools, and these findings are robust 
to controls for unobserved country effects. They are also supported by evidence from 
recent country cases. Though the reemergence of multiparty democracy in Africa 
has not led to a wholesale transformation of economic policies, these findings 
nonetheless suggest that it may be having a significant impact in individual policy 
areas.   
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1. Introduction  
 At the time of the African democracy movements of the 1990s 
opinions varied widely about the effect of democratization on economic 
performance and on economic policy. While some authors hoped that 
democracy would be associated with improved economic performance, other 
observers were less optimistic, suggesting that the adoption of the formal 
trappings of representative democracy would have only a limited impact.  
With several years of hindsight, we can begin to ask whether and how policies 
adopted by elected African governments have differed from those pursued by 
authoritarian regimes.  In order to address this question in a tractable manner, 
this paper focuses on one specific, but important area of government policy - 
public spending on education.  I ask whether the move to multiparty electoral 
competition in many African countries during the 1990s has prompted 
governments to spend more on education, and more on primary education in 
particular.  Recent African experience provides us with a natural experiment 
for testing this hypothesis; if during the 1980s free elections were almost 
absent in Africa, during the 1990s a number of African countries have moved 
towards a system where elections are more free and more open to 
participation of multiple candidates.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that in 
several cases electoral competition has prompted sitting governments to 
devote greater budgetary resources to primary education.  The Ugandan 
President’s decision in 1996 to establish free universal primary education was 
made in the middle of an election campaign.  In Tanzania and in Kenya a 
similar political context has prompted Presidents to announce a move to free 
universal primary education  This paper uses panel data on education 
spending and electoral competition to ask whether the above experiences are 
isolated events, or whether they are instead reflective of a more general 
phenomenon.  I also support my statistical findings by presenting qualitative 
evidence which shows that education spending has been a salient issue in a 
number of recent African election campaigns.   
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The logic underlying my hypothesis is that contested elections may 
have prompted African governments to be more responsive to the demands 
of the rural groups that form the majority of citizens in almost all African 
countries.  Under authoritarian regimes, in contrast, rulers will need to be 
relatively more responsive to urban groups, which can present a more credible 
threat of political unrest, following Bates (1981).  There are strong reasons to 
believe that when compared with urban groups, rural groups in Africa are 
more concerned with spending on primary education relative to secondary 
and tertiary education.  I develop my argument by drawing implications from 
literature on the politics of economic policy in African countries under 
authoritarian rule, compared with observations about the possible effects of 
electoral competition on political participation in Africa.  I then formalize the 
argument using a simple game-theoretic model.  One objective of this 
modeling exercise is to show that one does not need to assume that election 
outcomes are necessarily respected in order for multiparty democracy to have 
an effect on policy outcomes.   
My modeling approach also helps to identify the conditions under 
which an increase in political competition in African countries might not  lead 
to increased spending on primary education.  For example, increased electoral 
competition will have no impact on education spending if African voters have 
little means of subsequently  holding their elected representatives accountable 
by voting out of office those who fail to keep promises.  Likewise, if 
education is not a salient issue with the electorate when compared with other 
concerns, then the introduction of democracy will have little effect on 
spending in this area.  This identification of assumptions helps suggest when 
exactly my argument will apply, and it does so more precisely than would a 
more simple argument such as suggesting that “democracy prompts 
governments to cater to large constituencies”.    
I test my argument using cross-section time-series data covering 35 
African countries over the period 1981-1996.  The results show that when 
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they are subject to multiparty competition, African governments have tended 
to spend more on education, and more on primary education in particular.  
These results are statistically significant in OLS estimates, in fixed effect 
estimates which control for unobserved country effects, and in instrumental 
variables estimates which account for the possibility that one or more of the 
explanatory variables may be endogenous.  My results are robust to the 
inclusion of a number of control variables, and I also consider a number of 
problems including serial correlation, sample selection bias, failure to control 
for electoral fraud, and the possibility that the observed effect of electoral 
competition may vary according to the type of electoral system (PR vs. 
majoritarian) .  In my estimates the effect of electoral competition is also 
substantively significant.  A move from an unelected government to one 
elected in multi-party competition is estimated to result in an increase in 
education expenditures by 1.4% GDP in the OLS estimates.    
 In the remainder of the paper I first proceed in section 2 by 
considering theoretical arguments about the link between electoral 
competition and public spending.  Section 3 then considers evidence from 
several recent country cases.  Sections 4 and 5 then present cross-country data 
on education expenditures and political competition, and Section 6 presents 
panel data estimates of the effect of electoral competition on education 
spending.  Section 7 considers alternative specifications, omitted variables, and 
other robustness issues.  Section 8 concludes   
 
 
2. Electoral competition and education spending 
 I begin from the basic assumption that governments in political 
systems with competitive elections face fundamentally different threats to 
their rule compared with autocratic governments.  In an autocracy, the 
principal risk for a leader is that he or she will be overthrown by force.  In 
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countries where there are free elections contested by multiple candidates, 
rulers may still fear losing office through force, but they also need to 
anticipate the possibility of being voted out of office.  In an autocracy, leaders 
will logically need to pursue policies that will satisfy those groups that can 
credibly threaten to use force to obtain what they want.  When there are 
competitive elections, in contrast, rulers are more likely to face incentives to 
pursue policies that satisfy a majority among the electorate.   
 In African countries where governments are not obliged to compete in 
free elections, it is commonly argued that urban groups find it easier to 
organize and protest against government policies than do those who live in 
rural areas.  In a seminal contribution, Bates (1981) argued that rural groups in 
Africa face greater costs of collective action because they tend to be distant 
from a country’s capital, they are geographically separated, and they are 
frequently divided by language and/or ethnicity.  Urban groups in contrast, 
have the advantage of being more geographically concentrated.  According to 
Bates, differential costs of collective action between urban and rural groups 
helped explain why the economic policies adopted by African governments 
during the 1960s and 1970s tended to exhibit an urban bias.  So, for example, 
governments taxed agriculture while subsidizing imported food items 
consumed largely by urban groups.1 
 While Bates (1981) did not directly consider education spending, his 
theory has clear predictions for this area of government policy.  To the extent 
that urban groups in Africa tend, on average, to have more years of schooling 
than their rural counterparts, they are more likely to be concerned about 
government spending on secondary schools and universities, as well as 
spending on primary schools.  Rural groups, on the other hand, should place 
much greater weight on primary school spending alone.  Likewise, university 
students in some African countries have historically been one of the groups 
                                                 
1 This argument about an urban-rural divide may be modified if there are possibilities for transfers within 
families between urban and rural dwellers.  
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that has been most willing to demonstrate publicly against governments 
whose policies they oppose.  The same can hardly be said for primary school 
students.  These factors suggest that education spending in autocratic African 
countries will be biased against primary education.  Evidence of skewed 
education policies in African countries is readily available; during the 1980s 
the ratio between public education spending per university student and 
spending per primary school student was significantly higher in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than in other regions.2  Existing evidence also suggests that there is a 
significant urban-rural gap with regard to levels of primary school enrollment 
in African countries.   
 In the last fifteen years a number of African countries have moved 
away from autocracy and towards a system of selecting governments through 
elections.  Analysts of African politics have for some time debated whether 
democratization is likely to lead to significant changes in economic policy and 
in economic performance.  Callaghy (1993) launched an early caution against 
the assumption that political reform in African countries would necessarily 
result in fundamental changes in economic policies.  Herbst (1993) has 
highlighted the continuing obstacles to political mobilization of rural African 
groups in a democratic context.3  More recently Bayart (2000) has taken a 
pessimistic view suggesting that the (re)introduction of the formal trappings 
of democracy in African countries has had little real impact apart from 
exceptional cases such as Mali.  Van de Walle (2001) has arrived at a more 
nuanced conclusion, arguing that democratization in Africa has not yet 
resulted in a fundamental shift in the types of political pressures that African 
leaders face, yet it may nonetheless have initiated more long-term changes in 
the politics of economic decision making.4  It is worth noting that debates 
about the effect of democratization on economic policy have, of course, not 
                                                 
2 Pradhan (1996) shows that this ratio stood at 65.3 for the average African country in 1980 and 44.1 in 1990.  
In Latin America the relevant figures were 8.0 and 7.4 for 1980 and 1990 respectively.  In South Asia the 
relevant figures were 30.8 and 14.1 for 1980 and 1990 respectively.   
3 See also Widner (1993) for an in-depth study of rural political mobilization. 
4 See also the discussion in Lewis (1996). 
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been limited to African countries.  Brown and Hunter (1999) and Kaufman 
and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) have recently conducted empirical investigations 
about the effect of regime type on public spending in Latin America.      
While democratization has yet to lead to a wholesale reorientation of 
economic policy in African countries, if we are to determine whether electoral 
competition has had any impact it may be more productive to focus on 
changes in individual economic policy areas.  This provides the logic behind 
my focus on education spending.  Given that the majority of electors in 
almost all African countries live in rural areas, if we follow the above 
arguments, then one would expect politicians to become more responsive to 
the demands of rural groups when they are subject to electoral competition.  
This could include meeting demands for increased primary education 
spending.  To the extent that demands for primary education are met by 
increasing education expenditures rather than reallocating priorities within the 
education budget, one would expect to observe an increase in overall 
education spending as well.         
Any argument that democracy will lead to higher levels of education 
spending in African countries does depend upon several assumptions which 
may or may not be fulfilled.  Education spending must be a salient issue for 
voters, candidates must face incentives to implement promises regarding 
education spending once elected, and voters must have information at their 
disposal which allows them to judge whether promises have been kept.  
Finally, it must not be possible for incumbents to “buy off” potential 
opponents.  One of the purposes of developing the formal model in the next 
sub-section is precisely to identify these assumptions and to make them 
explicit.   
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A simple formalization of the argument 
Consider a society divided into two types of voters: those from rural 
areas and those from urban areas, with the rural group forming a majority.5  In 
this society decisions must be made between devoting available revenues to 
primary education p to university education u and to a third category of 
expenditures x.  The distribution of expenditures must meet an exogenous 
revenue constraint (normalized to unity) as presented in equation 1 below.   
Voters from rural areas prefer available revenues to be spent on 
primary schools, and they have a standard quadratic loss function, as 
presented in equation 2.  Voters from urban areas prefer revenue to be spent 
on university education, and they also have standard quadratic loss function.  
The incumbent's utility depends upon both primary school spending, 
secondary spending, and on the resources devoted to the third category of 
expenditures.  I keep the definition of this third category of expenditures 
deliberately vague in order to make the model applicable either to corruption 
(in which case x would be personal consumption) or to the financing of some 
sort of government activity from which rural and urban voters derive no 
utility. 
1=++ xup       (1) 
2)1( pLrural −=      (2) 
2)1( uLurban −=      (3) 
222 )1()1()1( xupLincumb −+−+−=    (4) 
I distinguish between two different scenarios for policy choice.  In the 
case without electoral competition the incumbent must face the risk of being 
overthrown if urban voters are sufficiently dissatisfied with the chosen 
spending policy.  If urban voters choose to revolt, then with probability q 
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their revolt is successful and all revenues are spent on university education.  
With probability 1-q the revolt fails, urban voters receive disutility of 1, and 
then the incumbent’s spending policy is maintained.  I assume that all players 
observe the probability of successful revolt q.  In the case with electoral 
competition the incumbent still faces the risk of being overthrown through 
violence, but he or she now also faces a challenge from another candidate.6  
For simplicity, I assume that the challenger has the same loss function as the 
incumbent.  Since rural voters are assumed to make up the majority, the 
expenditure proposal that minimizes their expected loss will win the election.  
In the case where challenger and incumbent propose the same policies, the 
election is decided by a coin toss.  The sequence of play in the two scenarios is 
as follows: 
Without electoral competition With electoral competition 
1. The incumbent chooses a 
distribution of expenditures 
1. The incumbent proposes a 
distribution of expenditures 
2. Urban voters choose whether 
to revolt.  
2. A challenger proposes a 
spending policy. 
 3. An election occurs and the 
winner's proposal is 
implemented. 
 4. Urban voters choose whether 
to revolt.   
   
I begin by identifying the sub-game perfect equilibrium in the case 
without electoral competition.  Here the preferences of rural voters are 
irrelevant for the incumbent, because there is no risk of being unseated in the 
election, and rural voters do not possess an option of revolting against 
spending policies.  As a result, at stage 1 the incumbent faces two options.  
                                                                                                                                               
5 I use the distinction between “urban” and “rural” here, but in principle the argument could apply to any two 
groups provided that one is in the majority, the other can pose a more credible threat of unrest, and the two 
groups have different preferences over spending.   
6 Election outcomes where there is a threat of unrest have previously been modelled by Ellman and 
Wantchekon (2000) 
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The first possibility is to minimize his or her loss subject to the revenue 
constraint (in which case the incumbent will divide expenditures evenly 
between the three items 31=== xup ).  Alternatively, the incumbent can 
compromise by offering urban voters their reservation payoff (the minimum 
level of spending on universities necessary to dissuade them from revolting) 
and then distribute the remaining revenues between primary schools and 
“other” spending.  Given that the urban group’s expected loss from revolting 
is 1-q, their reservation constraint will be satisfied as long as 2
1
)1(1 qu −−≥ .7  
This constraint is actually satisfied by the allocation 31=u  as long as 95≤q , and 
as a result for this range of probabilities the incumbent will not need to 
compromise.  When the probability that revolt will succeed is high ( 95>q ) the 
compromise strategy would involve allocating the minimum university 
expenditures necessary to satisfy this constraint ( 2
1
)1(1 qu −−= ).  The 
incumbent would then divide remaining expenditures evenly between primary 
schooling and other spending 2
1
)1(21 qxp −== .  The ruler will prefer to pursue 
the compromise strategy as long as the following inequality is satisfied.  The 
right hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the 
incumbent from not compromising while the left hand side represents the loss 
from compromising by satisfying the urban group’s reservation constraint.     
qqqq 2)1(1))1(1(2 34
2
2
1 2
1 +−<−+−−    (5) 
The inequality in expression 5 is in fact satisfied for all 95>q , so 
whenever the probability that revolt will succeed is high, the ruler will adopt 
the compromise strategy.8      
In the case with electoral competition incumbent politicians face 
different incentives.  They still face a potential risk of being unseated by a 
                                                 
7 I assume that when urban voters are indifferent between revolting and not revolting they will choose the 
latter option.  This has no consequence for the core results. 
8 The fact that revolt never occurs in equilibrium here is an artifact of the assumption of perfect information 
about p.  If I assumed more realistically that either the incumbent or urban voters are uncertain of the value 
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revolt, but in addition they face the risk of losing the election.  The election 
will be won by the candidate whose proposal provides a lower expected utility 
loss for rural voters, given that they are in the majority.  The key question, 
then, is whether at stage 3 rural voters would prefer a proposal that gives 
them their ideal policy p=1, or alternatively, whether they would prefer a 
compromise proposal that provides urban voters with their reservation payoff 
and then devotes remaining revenues to primary schools.  As before, the 
compromise proposal would involve setting 2
1
)1(1 qu −−=  and then devoting 
remaining revenues to primary schools, so 2
1
)1( qp −= .  Rural voters will 
prefer the compromise proposal as long as the following inequality is satisfied.  
The left hand side of the inequality represents their loss from compromising 
while the right hand side shows their expected loss from not compromising. 
qqq +−<−− )0)(1())1(1( 221    (6) 
This inequality is satisfied for all 10 << q , and as a result the policy 
proposal that minimizes the expected loss of rural voters is 
0,)1(1,)1( 2
1
2
1 =−−=−= xquqp .  We can then compare the equilibrium share 
of primary school spending with and without electoral competition.  Primary 
school spending is higher in the case with electoral competition for all values 
of q.  More specifically, when 95>q , primary school spending is exactly twice 
as high under electoral competition as in the case without a multiparty 
election.  When 95≤q  primary school spending is also higher when there is 
electoral competition.  Finally, the model also predicts that the overall 
education budget (primary + university) will be higher when there is electoral 
competition, since competition between incumbent and challenger will 
prompt them not to propose spending on other items.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
of p (or both), it would be possible for revolt to occur in equilibrium.  See Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) 
and Wantchekon (1999) for considerations of imperfect information and revolt. 
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Primary School Spending Under Different Scenarios 
 Without 
competition
With 
electoral 
competition
9
5≤q  31  
9
5>q  21)1(21 q−  
2
1
)1( q−  
 
The model I have presented here is obviously a very simplified 
description of the electoral process in any African country.  However, 
precisely because I have made the simplifying assumptions explicit, the model 
can help identify the conditions where increased electoral competition will not 
result in increased spending on primary schools.  First of all, the result above 
depends upon the assumption that if elected, both the incumbent and the 
challenger will have an incentive to implement the set of policies proposed 
during the election campaign.  This is most likely to occur when a leader seeks 
to implement a promise in order to subsequently be re-elected by the 
electorate, or to see his party returned to power.  The next section provides an 
example of this type of incentive mechanism in Uganda.  However, if leaders 
care little about the future (they have short time-horizons) one could observe 
a succession of promises by candidates to increase spending on primary 
schools, followed by failure to deliver on this promise. 9   
A second condition under which electoral competition will not 
influence education spending is if other issues dominate voters’ choice of 
candidate.  The simple framework here assumes that the only salient issue is 
how to divide up expenditures between primary schools, higher education, 
and other consumption.  This does not imply that education has to be the 
most prominent issue in an electoral campaign in order for democracy to 
result in higher spending in this area, but the issue does need to have at least 
                                                 
9 See Fearon (1998) and Ferejohn (1986) for a discussion of retrospective voting rules that could be used to 
enforce commitment to a campaign promise. 
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some salience with voters.  The next section contrasts recent experience in 
Uganda, where primary education has been a highly salient issue with the 
electorate, with Malawi where other issues, and in particular regional divisions, 
have dominated voting.     
Finally, the model above also assumes that it is impossible for the 
incumbent to coopt the challenger with side payments.  If the incumbent 
could transfer part of x to the challenger in exchange for the challenger not 
declaring a candidacy (or not waging a serious campaign), then it might be 
possible for both incumbent and challenger to improve on their expected loss.  
In the static context presented here, it would not actually be subgame perfect 
for the challenger to stick the agreement; he or she would instead have an 
incentive to accept the transfer and then wage a serious campaign anyway.  In 
a context of repeated elections, however, it would be possible to sustain such 
collusion.  There is clear evidence that such collusion between incumbents 
and challengers has taken place in some African countries.10 
 What the above discussion suggests then is that increased electoral 
competition may be associated with greater spending on primary education, 
but that this outcome depends on several assumptions about the democratic 
process that may not always be fulfilled.  As previously argued, however, the 
model does not assume that outcomes of democratic elections are necessarily 
respected, since one group here retains the option of revolt.  This is an 
important point, because it is implausible to assume otherwise.  Nor does the 
model rely on implausible assumptions about the information available to 
voters for monitoring whether campaign promises are kept.  African rural 
voters may not necessarily have access to full statistics on public spending on 
education, but they are able to easily observe whether new schools are built in 
                                                 
10 In Gabon, the President, Omar Bongo, has granted sizeable public allowances to all opposition parties, as 
well as other perks such as four-wheel drive vehicles in exchange for limits on competition.  See Stephen 
Smith, "Omar Bongo propose à l’opposition gabonaise la ‘gestion collective’ de l’État", Le Monde, January 21, 
2002.   
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their district, whether new teachers are hired, and especially, whether fees for 
schooling are reduced.    
One final theoretical issue involves the possibility that the model I have 
presented here could apply to other world regions.  I have framed the model 
in terms of a particular division between African rural and urban groups that 
was emphasized by Bates (1981).  One can nonetheless identify a more 
general underlying hypothesis – in any society that moves towards more free 
and open electoral competition one should expect that this would be 
accompanied by a reorientation of public spending towards those groups 
which posts a potential electoral threat and which did not previously pose a 
credible threat of influencing a government through non-electoral means.  
This would depend upon the above assumptions about salience of a particular 
issue and ex post incentives for politicians being fulfilled. 
 
3. Evidence from recent African elections 
Though the main empirical tests presented in this paper are based on 
cross-country data, more detailed evidence from individual African election 
campaigns can also be used to demonstrate that primary education can be a 
salient issue, and that electoral competition can prompt governments to 
reorient resources towards primary schools.  This section briefly reviews 
recent experience in Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania and Kenya that supports the 
subsequent statistical results and which also help identify important 
differences between countries that the quantitative tests might not capture.  
The contrast between Uganda and Malawi in particular suggests that when 
voters split sharply along regional lines, election winners may have less of an 
incentive to deliver on national issues like universal primary education, 
precisely because it is less salient to voters.  This is consistent with the 
theoretical model developed above.  The four country cases also shed light on 
several other aspects of the theoretical model.  For one, in all four countries 
 14
debates about primary education, and in particular the abolition of school 
fees, have received widespread press and radio coverage.  This shows that 
voters have information necessary to monitor government performance in 
this area.  In addition, the Ugandan example suggests how the desire for re-
election can create incentives for an incumbent to meet campaign promises 
regarding education spending.   
 Uganda since 1996 is a clear case of an African country in which the 
establishment of multi-candidate elections has helped result in a reorientation 
of government spending towards primary education.  Despite the atypical 
aspect of Uganda’s “no-party democracy”, where political parties exist but 
cannot officially campaign for candidates, the country’s 1996 presidential 
election was a hotly contested one, which saw the incumbent, Yoweri 
Museveni, challenged by Paul Ssemogerere, the leader of Uganda’s 
Democratic Party.  Though most observers before the election believed 
Museveni stood a good chance of winning, he was not expected to walk away 
with the election.11  As part of a series of manifesto commitments, Museveni 
promised if elected to implement a Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
program that would abolish primary school fees for four children in every 
family.12  Though this promise was not initially intended to be the centerpiece 
of Museveni’s campaign, it received a very favorable response from the 
electorate.  The popularity of the UPE program provides one plausible 
explanation why Museveni was able to both win the election by a large 
margin, attracting 74% of the vote, and even outpolling Ssemogerere in the 
opposition candidate’s own region of Buganda.  This was certainly the 
conclusion drawn by many of Museveni’s close advisors, as they urged 
Ugandan Ministry of Finance officials to find the necessary funds to finance 
the UPE program, arguing “we won the election because of the UPE pledge, 
                                                 
11 According to one report, several foreign diplomats in Kampala predicted Museveni would win 60% of the 
vote, and a pre-election poll forecast a similar outcome.  See Ottemoeller (1998) p.100.  
12 See Yoweri Museveni, “Tackling the Tasks Ahead”, 1996 election manifesto. 
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so we have to come up with the money for it.13  Since 1996 the Ugandan 
government has significantly reoriented expenditures toward primary 
education.  Overall public education expenditures increased from 20.2% of 
recurrent government expenditures in the three years before UPE to an 
average of 26.3% of expenditures in the three years after the program was 
announced.14  There is clear evidence that the UPE program has contributed 
to Museveni’s overall popularity, as 87% of the Ugandans surveyed in 2000 by 
the Afrobarometer research project reported that their government was 
handling education issues “fairly well” or “very well” (Bratton, Lambright, and 
Sentamu, 2000).  Not surprisingly given this positive reaction, when beginning 
his 2001 re-election campaign, President Museveni chose to remind voters 
that he had successfully delivered on his 1996 UPE pledge. 15       
 In Malawi in 1994, as had happened in Uganda in 1996, the winning 
candidate in a presidential election moved soon after his victory to make good 
on a campaign pledge of abolishing primary school feels.  The Malawian 
government also moved quickly to spend more on primary education in order 
to compensate schools for the loss of fees.  Primary education spending as a 
percentage of GDP jumped from 1.5% in 1994 to 2.6% in 1995.  However, 
unlike in Uganda, the Malawian government failed to sustain this increased 
spending, in particular after 1999 when education spending dropped 
dramatically.16  As a result, the move towards multi-party competition in 
Malawi, which saw Bakili Muluzi win the first multi-party elections in 1994, 
has not resulted in a durable reorientation of public expenditures towards 
primary education.  There appear to be two possible explanations for this 
outcome.  First of all, Malawi in the late 1990s suffered from much greater 
macroeconomic instability than Uganda.  This complicated any attempt to 
increase education spending.  Secondly, one might also argue that precisely 
                                                 
13 Interviews with former Ugandan officials, December 2002. 
14 based on World Bank data. 
15 The New Vision, Kampala, March 9th, 2001. 
16 See “Malawi: Public Expenditures, Issues and Options”, World Bank, Public Expenditure Review, 
September 200.   
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because voting in presidential elections in Malawi has been highly polarized 
along regional lines, President Muluzi faced less of an incentive to deliver on 
this issue in order to be reelected.  In the 1994 presidential contest Muluzi 
won 78% of the vote in Malawi’s southern region, but only 27.5% of the vote 
in the central region, and only 4.5% of the votes in the North.17  In Uganda in 
1996 there was also a clear regional pattern of voting, with President 
Museveni, receiving his highest share of votes in the west of the country, but 
Museveni also won over 50% of the vote outside his home region.  In 
contrast, the Malawian results suggest that regional affiliation almost 
completely determined choice of candidate.  Given the regional pattern of 
voting in Malawi, which remained very similar in the 1999 election, it would 
seem unlikely that either of President Muluzi’s election victories have 
depended upon his stance on national issues like primary education 
spending.18    
In addition to the Ugandan and Malawian examples, there is also more 
recent evidence from Tanzania and Kenya that electoral competition can help 
lead to a reorientation in policy priorities towards primary education.  It is too 
early to judge to what extent either of these cases represents a true 
reorientation in policy – that will only be made clear if there is a sustained 
increase in public spending on primary education to compensate for the 
abolition of fees – but it is nonetheless interesting to note that in both cases 
the promise of free primary education clearly struck a chord with the 
electorate.   
In Kenya, during the December 2002 election campaign the National 
Rainbow Coalition of Mwai Kibaki made abolition of primary school fees a 
manifesto commitment.  In contrast, the candidate of Kenya’s ruling KANU 
party claimed that Kibaki would never be able to find the money necessary to 
                                                 
17 Results reported by Wiseman (2000).  See Posner (1995) and Chirwa (1998) for discussions of regionalism 
in Malawian politics.   
18 One could, of course, still argue that he had a strong incentive to deliver services like public education to 
voters in his own home region, but the focus here is on the extent to which electoral competition generates a 
reallocation of spending on a national basis. 
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deliver on his promise.19  While Kibaki’s eventual victory was attributable 
above all to dissatisfaction with Kenya’s outgoing President, Daniel Arap Moi, 
during the course of the campaign one observer suggested that Kibaki’s 
promise of free primary education drew more applause from voters than any 
other issue.20  After his election Kibaki waited only a few days after assuming 
power before making good on his promise, a decision that drew heavy press 
coverage. 
A similar sequence of events occurred in Tanzania.  During the 
campaign leading up to the October 2000 presidential elections, a number of 
candidates promised to reduce or abolish fees for primary school attendance.  
Among these was the incumbent, Benjamin Mkapa, who was successfully 
reelected.  A few months after his election victory, President Mkapa 
announced that his government would abolish all primary school fees.21  He 
subsequently made his plans more concrete by saying that the Tanzanian 
government would increase education’s share of the recurrent budget to 25% 
and that  62% of this sum would be devoted to primary education.22 
4. Data on education spending 
 In order to test my argument about democracy and education spending 
on a cross-country basis, it would be useful to have data on total government 
spending on education, as well as government spending on primary education.  
In the regressions that follow I consider overall education spending, in 
addition to primary school spending, because data coverage on overall 
education spending is more complete.  If primary school spending is 
increased, unless this increase is financed exclusively by a transfer from other 
areas of the education budget, then increased primary school spending will 
also result in an observed increase in overall education spending.  Data on the 
different components of education spending has been compiled by UNESCO 
                                                 
19 “Narc answers Uhuru over remark”, East African Standard, December 8th, 2002.  
20 See “Primary Schools in Kenya, Fees Abolished, Are Filled to Overflowing”, New York Times, 7 January 
2003. 
21 Sunday Observer (Dar es Salaam) April 1, 2001. 
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for a number of African countries.23   These data are also reported in the 
World Bank's World Development Indicators.  Given that there is little if any 
African education spending data available for the years before 1981, in this 
study I have concentrated on the period 1981-96.  I have compiled data on 
total education spending for 35 countries for which the average number of 
annual observations available over the period is 10.  Likewise, data on primary 
education expenditures is available for 33 countries with an average of 6 
annual observations over the period.   
Figure 1 presents African averages for overall public spending on 
education as a share of GDP, in addition to public spending on primary 
education as a share of GDP.  As can be seen, after a decline during the 
1980s, in the early 1990s African governments increased their outlays for 
education and for primary education in particular.   While Figure 1 is useful 
for presenting cross-country trends, it masks the fact that there has also been 
considerable variation in patterns of education spending across countries.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for four key measures of education 
spending.  For each of these four variables, between-country variation is quite 
significant.  
Cross-country data on education statistics may be subject to a number 
of potential biases and collection errors.  Behrman and Rosenszweig (1994) 
have argued this for enrollment data collected by UNESCO.  In order to 
consider this possibility, I compared the UNESCO data for overall public 
spending on education with that reported by the IMF in its Government Finance 
Statistics publication, as well as with data collected by Mingat and Suchaut 
(2000) for African countries.  The UNESCO data are in fact very highly 
correlated with data from both of these other sources, and there are almost no 
cases of large discrepancies.24  While the IMF and Mingat and Suchaut (2000) 
                                                                                                                                               
22 The Guardian, Dar es Salaam, November 1, 2001. 
23 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. 
24 The simple correlation coefficient between the UNESCO data and the Mingat and Suchaut data was 0.92, 
while the correlation coefficient with the IMF data was 0.82.    
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do not report statistics for primary education spending, given that primary 
education spending (in %GDP) is very highly correlated with overall public 
spending on education, this result should also increase confidence in the 
UNESCO primary education data.25 
 
5. Measuring electoral competition 
 Researchers in recent years have compiled a number of different cross-
country indices of democracy, political rights, and political competition.  It has 
become increasingly frequent for economists and political scientists to include 
these political variables in cross-country regressions on subjects such as the 
determinants of economic growth.  Two of the most frequently used indices 
of this sort are the Gastil indices of political and civil liberties.  However, as 
emphasized by Bates (1995), the Gastil index remains a very uncertain tool for 
quantitative research, because the methodology used to compile it is not made 
public.  Another problem is that the Gastil indices and other indices, such as 
the Polity III measure of democracy, appear to measure very broad features of 
a country’s political system (democracy vs. authoritarianism).   
 Fortunately for the purposes of this study, a Harvard-based group of 
researchers has compiled specific data on the openness of recruitment of chief 
executives and legislators in African countries.26  This data set is highly 
correlated with existing measures of electoral competition, such as the Polity 
III dataset’s measure of the openness of executive recruitment, but it has the 
advantage of being constructed from objective indicators.27  For executive 
                                                 
25 One final data issue concerns donor financing.  The UNESCO data on education spending is based on a 
questionnaire distributed to governments on an annual basis.  Until very recently the questionnaire has not 
asked governments to distinguish between education spending that is financed by revenues and education 
spending financed by donors.  For the majority of African countries in the sample this may not pose an issue, 
as a recent World Bank report (2001) has suggested that "official development assistance represents only 3-4 
percent of total expenditure on education in Africa".  For some countries, however, and notably post-conflict 
states, donor-financed education expenditures may represent up to half of all public expenditures on 
education.  If in filling out their UNESCO questionnaires governments such as these did not include donor-
financed education spending in their calculations, it would introduce a degree of measurement error. 
26 See Bates (1995) as well as Ferree and Singh (1999). 
27 The pairwise correlation coefficient with the relevant Polity III measure is 0.72 for African countries. 
 20
recruitment the data collectors asked five questions relevant to the degree of 
competitiveness: 
 
1. Is there a chief executive? 
2. Was the executive elected? 
3. Was the executive the only candidate in the election? 
4. Were multiple political parties allowed to contest the election? 
5. Did candidates from more than one party contest the election?  
These responses provides indications about the degree of political 
competition, and they are ideally suited for testing my theoretical argument.  
In practice, in the 35 country sample used in this study there are three groups 
of countries in terms of levels of electoral competition.  In 28% of country-
years there is no electoral competition, meaning that the country had an 
executive but the executive was not elected.  In a further 37% of country-
years there was an executive who was elected, but only a single candidate 
contested the election (or in a handful of cases multiple candidates from the 
same political party contested the election).  Finally, in a further 35% of 
country-years the executive was elected and candidates from multiple political 
parties stood in the election.28  Given this distribution, I have created three 
dummy variables to indicate the level of electoral competition: “no electoral 
competition”, “single-party competition”, and “multiparty competition”.  It is 
important for purposes of interpretation to note that these variables are coded 
so that a country where the executive is elected in a multiparty contest is given 
a value of 1 for the variable "multiparty competition" but a value of 0 for the 
variable "single-party competition".  This ensures that the two variables are 
                                                 
28 Uganda is one country that is difficult to classify within this scheme.  Even though political parties are 
formally banned from supporting individual candidates in Uganda, the fact that has been widely recognized in 
presidential elections which candidates are favored by which party argues in favor of classifying Uganda as 
having multiparty competition, despite the legal restrictions.  Due to missing data, no data from Uganda post-
1996 was used in the regressions for this paper.          
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uncorrelated when entered into the regression.  The hypothesis developed in 
Section 2 suggests that education spending, and in particular primary 
education spending, will be higher in countries with “multiparty competition”.  
In contrast, the theory presented in Section 2 provides no specific argument 
why countries with “single-party competition” should have different levels of 
education spending from those countries without any electoral competition 
(unelected executives).  The “single-party competition” variable in the next 
section’s regressions is included primarily as a control.  As can be seen in 
Figure 2, the percentage of African countries with multiparty competition 
increased very significantly during the 1990s.  Table 6 provides a presentation 
of individual country-years included in the regressions, together with the 
reported level of electoral competition.       
 
6. Panel estimates of the determinants of education spending 
 In order to explore the relationship between electoral competition and 
education spending, I estimated a series of cross-section time-series 
regressions for African countries using annual data for the period 1981-1996.  
These involved data concerning both public spending on education in general 
and public spending on primary education in particular.  The regressions in 
Tables 2 and 4 use spending in percent of GDP as a dependent variable.  This 
would seem to be an appropriate indicator of the resources devoted by 
government to a particular activity.  However, there may be several problems 
with this method of measurement.  For one, it ignores the fact that for 
exogenous reasons, some governments may have access to lower levels of 
revenue than others.  Second, when spending variables are expressed relative 
GDP, then changes in relative prices in the economy (between the non-
tradeables and tradeables sectors) may lead to apparent changes in spending 
without a government actually altering its budgetary priorities.  Given that 
there were significant shifts in relative prices in a number of African 
economies during the sample period, this may be a real concern.  To take 
 22
account of both of these possibilities, the regressions in Table 3 and Table 5 
consider determinants of spending when education spending is expressed as a 
share of total government spending.               
 In the regressions in Tables 2-5, each of the spending variables is 
regressed on several independent variables, including indicator variables for 
“single-party” political competition, “multiparty” political competition, and 
dummy variables for elections in the previous, current, and following year.  
Since the base group here is countries without electoral competition, the 
“single-party” and “multiparty” variables then capture estimated differences 
relative to this group.  As previously mentioned, the hypothesis developed in 
Section 2 pertains to “multiparty competition” in particular.  The inclusion of 
the electoral dummies is intended to test the common argument that during 
electoral `periods governments will face increased pressures to spend.  While 
the number of obvious control variables to use in these regressions is limited, 
I included the log of per capita GDP as an independent variable, based on the 
conjecture that governments in richer countries may tend to spend a greater 
share of their national income on education, while governments in richer 
countries are also likely to devote a smaller share of their total education 
spending to primary schools.  I preferred a static specification here, that does 
not include a lagged dependent variable, for several reasons.  First of all, I am 
interested foremost in identifying the long-run effects of changes in political 
institutions.  Second, due to the large number of missing observations, 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, would have significantly reduced the 
sample size.  The discussion of robustness in Section 7 considers whether my 
results may be biased by serial correlation of the error terms, given that I have 
not included a lagged dependent variable in the specification.  
I also include total overseas aid as a control, based on the fact that 
when negotiating structural adjustment packages, donors in recent years have 
frequently suggested that governments should privilege expenditures on key 
services like education, and in particular primary education.  Rather than 
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arguing that aid is directly allocated to education expenditures, given the 
earlier observation that direct donor financing of public education in Africa 
remains limited in most countries, the argument here is that an increased 
reliance on donor financing may prompt a government to pursue expenditure 
objectives advocated by donors.  The variable “overseas aid” represents total 
overseas development assistance in % GDP.  
 Table 2 estimates total government spending on education in %GDP 
using three different methods.  Regression (1) is a pooled OLS estimate which 
shows that both single-party and multiparty political competition are 
positively and significantly correlated with total government spending on 
education.  The coefficient on “multiparty competition” is larger than that for 
“single-party political competition”, however.  A move to multiparty 
competition is estimated to result in an increase of total education spending 
by 1.4% of GDP.  Spending on education does not seem to be significantly 
different during electoral periods according to these estimates.  A set of 
dummy variables for unobserved year effects was not jointly significant in this 
specification, and so it was excluded.29   
  Regression (2) is a fixed effects model that controls for unobserved 
country-specific effects.  The coefficients on both electoral competition 
variables remain highly significant, although the coefficient on “multiparty 
competition” is now smaller in magnitude than in the OLS regressions.  The 
coefficient on “single-party competition” is now actually larger than in the 
OLS estimates.  The election variables remain insignificant, and the coefficient 
on overseas aid is actually negative and highly significant.   
According to regression 2, countries in which executives are elected in 
multiparty competition are not actually estimated to have higher levels of 
education spending than are countries where executives are elected in single-
candidate competitions.  Further observation suggests a clear reason for the 
                                                 
29 The same was true for all other regressions in the study. 
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difference between the OLS and fixed effects estimates.  The country mean 
values for education spending, which are subtracted out in the fixed effects 
model, are positively and significantly correlated with the "multiparty 
competition" variable, and they are negatively correlated with the "single-party 
competition" variable.  This result is attributable above all to the fact that four 
countries in the sample have had both multi-party competition and high levels 
of education spending throughout the period considered (Botswana, Namibia, 
Senegal, and Zimbabwe).  Given that the OLS results strongly suggest that 
"multiparty competition" has a larger effect on spending than does a move to 
"single-party competition", the fixed effects result should not be taken as 
demonstrating that multiparty competition is irrelevant.  The fixed effects 
results should instead be read as suggesting the following: we can reject the 
hypothesis that the observed difference between countries with elected 
executives and countries with unelected executives is attributable to 
unobserved country effects, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
observed difference between "multiparty competition" and "single-party" 
competition is attributable to unobserved country effects.   
One potential concern with regressions (1) and (2) is that foreign aid in 
particular might not be pre-determined.  Foreign aid might be endogenous to 
education spending to the extent that countries that spend more on education 
might subsequently have less need for foreign aid if they enjoy high rates of 
growth.  Likewise, foreign aid might be endogenous if donors give higher 
levels of assistance to governments that have a track record of prioritizing 
education.  To deal with this issue I also estimated a fixed-effects model 
where I instrumented for overseas aid using lagged differences of the aid 
variable.  By instrumenting for aid with lagged differences I am ensuring that 
my instruments are not themselves correlated with country fixed effects.  
Regression (3) shows that the result with regard to political competition 
remains essentially unchanged.  In addition, the coefficient on foreign aid 
remains statistically significant and it is actually more negative than in the 
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fixed effects model without instruments.  With this said, interpretations of this 
result may be complicated by the fact that data on education spending for 
some countries may not include donor-financed expenditures.    
Table 3 estimates government spending on education as a  percentage 
of total government spending using OLS, fixed effects, and fixed effects with 
instrumental variables.  The results are quite similar to the Table 2 estimates.  
Both “single-party” political competition and “multiparty” political 
competition are positively correlated with education spending.  In the fixed 
effects estimates the coefficient on “multiparty competition” is somewhat 
smaller than in the OLS regression, while the coefficient on “single-party 
competition” is somewhat larger.  The coefficient on overseas aid is negative 
and significant at the 10% level in all three regressions here.   
Table 4 uses the same specifications as in Tables 2 and 3 but to 
investigate the determinants of spending on primary education (in %GDP).  
The coefficients on both electoral competition variables are again positive and 
statistically significant in the OLS estimates.  Based on this regression, 
establishing multiparty competition would be associated with an increase in 
primary education spending by 0.8% GDP.  In the fixed effects regressions 
the coefficients for both “single-party” and “multiparty” competition are 
smaller in magnitude than in regression 1.  Finally, the coefficient on overseas 
aid is again negative and highly significant in all three regressions.  
Table 5 reports estimates of the determinants of primary education 
spending, when outlays are measured as a percentage of total government 
spending.  The results here are again quite similar to those reported in Table 4.  
Both “single-party” and “multiparty” political competition are associated with 
higher expenditures on primary education. 
In addition to the regressions reported in Tables 2-5, I also considered 
whether the share of the total government education budget devoted to 
primary schools was positively correlated with electoral competition.  In all 
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cases this share was estimated to be significantly higher in countries with 
multi-party competition, though for reasons of space I have not reported 
these results here.   
 
7. Alternative specifications and robustness 
 There are a number of issues concerning measurement of my different 
variables as well as potentially omitted variables, and this section considers 
each in turn.  First of all, the measure of multi-party political competition that 
I have used may not fully reflect the degree to which presidential elections are 
free and open.  In a number of cases where multiple candidates have 
contested an election, incumbents have used various means to rig the 
outcome, by intimidating opponents, by voting fraud, or other means.  If 
failure to account for such restrictions implies a bias in my estimates, it would 
probably involve a bias against finding that democratic governments spend 
more on primary education.  This would be true to the extent that one might 
expect governments that engaged in fraud to spend less on primary education.  
Rather than rely solely on this conjecture, however, I considered the problem 
further by repeating the regressions from Tables 2-5 while only counting as 
having “multiparty” competition those countries in which the president was 
elected with less than 80% of the vote.  This was based on the idea that 
lopsided election outcomes are an indicated of restrictions on political 
competition in practice.  All results in Tables 2-5 remained robust, as they did 
when I lowered the threshold to 75% and to 70%.     
 An additional alternative specification in my regressions involves 
distinguishing between countries that elect representatives based on 
proportional representation, and those with majoritarian electoral systems.  
Though the theory developed in Section 2 pertains directly to executives, 
rather than legislatures, it might be argued that multiparty political 
competition also gives individual legislators an incentive to take decisions to 
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spend more on primary education.  As a consequence, it might be important 
to separate out governments where there is multiparty competition and 
legislators are elected based on proportional representation from those 
governments where legislators are elected in a first past the post system.  A 
number of studies have argued that incentives for legislators to deliver public 
services are much weaker in PR systems, given the weaker links between 
individual representatives and individual constituencies.  In order to consider 
this possibility I re-ran the regressions from Tables 2-5 while creating two 
“multiparty competition” variables – one for PR countries and one for 
majoritarian countries.  The coefficients on both of these variables remained 
positive, statistically significant, and of similar magnitude in all cases (tests 
failed to reject the null that they were not identical).   
An additional possible oversight involves the effect of national wage 
decisions.  Wages for teachers are the largest single spending item for 
education ministries in Africa.  Given that decisions regarding civil service 
wages in African countries are typically made in a centralized manner, it may 
be the case that education expenditures depend more on the overall 
remuneration policy of a government than on the priority it gives to 
education.  To consider this possibility I re-estimated the regressions while 
including an additional variable that represents the average civil servant wage 
as a multiple of per capita GDP.  Data were only available for the period after 
1986 (from Leinert and Modi, 1997), resulting in the loss of a number of 
observations in the sample.  The coefficients on the electoral competition 
variables remained significant in the OLS regressions though not in the fixed 
effects regressions.  It should be noted, however, that this loss of significance 
is not surprising given that the sample was reduced to half its original size in 
these re-estimated regressions.   
A second potential specification issue concerns my foreign aid variable.  
Different donors may attach different priorities to education expenditures, yet 
the variable used in Tables 2-5 aggregates aid from all different donors.  As a 
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result, it may obscure the effects that individual donors may have on 
education policies.  To consider this possibility I re-estimated the regressions 
while substituting net aid flows from the World Bank for the overall aid 
variable.  The World Bank has been particularly vocal of late in calling for 
governments to prioritize education expenditures.  Interestingly, the 
coefficient on the World Bank aid variable was always negative and significant 
in the OLS regressions and negative and generally significant in the fixed 
effects regressions.   
In addition to possible omission or misspecification of relevant 
variables, given the large number of missing observations in my dataset, there 
also exists the possibility that the results reported in Tables 2-5 are subject to a 
sample selection bias.  For example, it might be the case that governments in 
less democratic countries, or in poorer countries, are less likely to provide data 
on education expenditures.  This would be particularly problematic to the 
extent that a country’s likelihood of providing data is correlated with my key 
explanatory variables regarding political competition.  I was able to rule out 
this possibility for both the data on overall education expenditures and 
primary education expenditures.  The variable “multi-party competition” is 
only very weakly correlated with the probability of a government not 
providing overall education data (-0.03) and even more weakly correlated with 
the probability of not providing primary education data (0.004).   
I also considered whether the results reported in Tables 2-5 are affected 
by serial correlation of the error terms.  When I re-estimated the regressions 
from Tables 2-5, including an AR1 term, the results with regard to the 
coefficients on “multiparty” political competition and overseas aid were 
largely unchanged.  However, one of the potential pitfalls in dealing with serial 
correlation by estimating an AR1 term is that in datasets with relatively short 
time-series, estimates of the autocorrelation parameter are likely to prove 
imprecise.  As a result, Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainthan (2002) have 
suggested an alternative method of identifying whether results are biased by 
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serial correlation.  This method provides an estimate of the effect of multi-
party competition on education spending that is not biased by serial 
correlation, since it ignores the time-series dimension of the data.  Using this 
method my results also remained statistically significant.30   
As a final robustness issue, I investigated the possibility that the results 
presented above were influenced by outliers.  In the Table 2-5 estimates the 
only significant change after exclusion of outliers (identified based on dfbeta 
values) involved the coefficient on the "single-party" political competition 
variable which in regression 1 from Table 2 and 1 from Table 3 became 
smaller in magnitude and less significant.   
 
8. Conclusion 
 Though the arrival of multi-party democracy has failed to trigger a 
wholesale revision of economic policies in African countries, in this paper I 
have argued that this lack of a general transformation may nonetheless 
obscure important changes in individual policy areas.  Multi-party democracy 
may logically give African leaders a greater incentive to cater to the demands 
of rural groups, and in the area of education, rural groups are concerned 
above all with primary schooling.  I have developed this hypothesis with a 
simple game-theoretic model that does not depend upon the assumption that 
election outcomes are always respected.  Results of cross-country regressions 
show that governments subject to competition have in fact spent more on 
education and more on primary education in particular.  This result remains 
robust when controlling for unobserved country effects.  It would be 
interesting for future research to consider whether this pattern of democracy 
                                                 
30 Following their method, I first regressed each of my education spending variables on a set of country 
dummies and on all covariates in my regression with the exception of the “multiparty” political competition 
dummy variable.  Then, retaining the residuals for those countries in my dataset for which there was a shift 
towards multiparty competition, I collapsed the data into two time periods: “before multi-party competition” 
and “after multi-party competition”.  I then regressed the residuals on an “after multi-party competition” 
dummy.   
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leading to a more equitable distribution of spending between urban and rural 
groups can also be observed in other areas of policy. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics on education spending 
 
 Nobs Mean Within 
country  
stdev 
Between 
country 
stdev 
Min. Max. 
Government spending on 
education %GDP 
324 4.12 0.86 1.91 0.37 10.3 
Government spending on 
primary education % GDP 
188 1.93 0.35 1.04 0.34 5.17 
Govt spending on education as 
% of total spending 
324 16.3 5.1 3.5 2.6 29.2 
Govt spending on primary 
education as % of total 
spending 
188 7.6 1.4 3.2 1.5 15.7 
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Figure 1: Trends in government spending on education 
(African averages) 
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Figure 2: Trends in the openness of political competition 
 
(Percent of countries where executive elected in multiparty competition) 
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Table 2: Electoral competition and the education budget I 
(Dependent variable: govt spending on education, % GDP) 
 
 OLS 
 
(1) 
Fixed effects 
 
(2) 
IV- fixed effects 
 
(3) 
Single-party 
competition 
  .286* 
(.164) 
   .789*** 
(.216) 
   .781*** 
(.204) 
Multiparty 
competition 
    1.42*** 
(.285) 
   .645*** 
(.192) 
   .683*** 
(.188) 
Election year -.179 
(.153) 
.076 
(.097) 
.068 
(.092) 
Election previous year -.243 
(.168) 
-.043 
(.096) 
-.041 
(.091) 
Election next year -.128 
(.171) 
.101 
(.090) 
.106 
(.086) 
Per capita GDP (log)    .903*** 
(.149) 
.211 
(.149) 
.201 
(.141) 
Aid (%GDP) -.013 
(.008) 
  -.025*** 
(.009) 
 -.035*** 
(.015) 
Constant  -1.64* 
(0.96) 
   2.60*** 
(0.91) 
   2.77*** 
(0.89) 
N= 324 324 324 
R2 0.31 0.13 0.13 
H0:single-
party=multiparty 
p<0.01 p=0.46 p=0.61 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
  p=0.38 
Standard errors in parentheses (panel corrected standard errors for OLS, heteroskedastic consistent 
for regressions 2 and 3. Regression (3) instruments for Aid using first four lagged differences. *. **, 
and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Electoral competition and the education budget II 
(Dependent variable: % of total govt spending to education) 
 
 OLS 
 
(1) 
Fixed effects 
 
(2) 
IV-fixed effects 
 
(3) 
Single-party 
competition 
1.14 
(0.85) 
  3.20** 
(1.30) 
  3.19*** 
(1.23) 
Multiparty 
competition 
   4.73*** 
(0.96) 
   3.84*** 
(1.85) 
   3.89*** 
(1.12) 
Election year -.657 
(.587) 
-.259 
(.584) 
-.270 
(.555) 
Election previous year -.640 
(.662) 
-.456 
(.581) 
-.453 
(.548) 
Election next year -.490 
(.519) 
-.118 
(.541) 
-.111 
(.512) 
Per capita GDP (log)     1.11** 
(.428) 
  1.97** 
(0.89) 
  1.96** 
(0.84) 
Aid (%GDP)   -.188*** 
(.035) 
-1.02* 
(.055) 
            -.116 
(.088) 
Constant    10.4*** 
(3.21) 
3.33 
(5.50) 
3.56 
(5.34) 
N= 324 324 324 
R2 0.23 0.18 0.19 
H0:single-
party=multiparty 
p<0.01 p=0.59 p=0.54 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
  p=0.89 
Standard errors in parentheses (panel corrected standard errors for OLS, heteroskedastic consistent 
for regressions 2 and 3.. Regression (3) instruments for Aid using first four lagged differences.  *. **, 
and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Electoral competition and primary education I 
(Dependent variable: govt spending on primary education %GDP) 
 
 OLS 
 
(1) 
Fixed effects 
 
(2) 
IV-fixed effects 
 
(3) 
Single-party 
competition 
   .427*** 
(.158) 
  .297** 
(.134) 
   .283** 
(.124) 
Multiparty 
competition 
   .837*** 
(.199) 
   .254** 
(.131) 
   .315*** 
(.127) 
Election year  -.006 
(.115) 
-.008 
(.059) 
-.023 
(.055) 
Election previous year  .176* 
(.105) 
.005 
(.056) 
 .007 
(.052) 
Election next year  .170* 
(.092) 
 .096* 
(.057) 
  .113** 
(.054) 
Per capita GDP (log)    .450*** 
(.065) 
 -.067 
(.164) 
-.079 
(.152) 
Aid (%GDP)   -.026*** 
(.006) 
 -.011** 
(.005) 
  -.021*** 
(.008) 
Constant   -.973*** 
(.410) 
  2.25** 
(1.00) 
   2.44*** 
(0.94) 
N= 188 188 188 
R2 0.39 0.09 0.17 
H0:single-
party=multiparty 
p<0.01 p=0.74 p=0.81 
Overidentifying 
restrictions 
  p=0.09 
Standard errors in parentheses (panel corrected standard errors for OLS, heteroskedastic consistent 
for regressions 2 and 3.. Regression (3) instruments for Aid using first four lagged differences.  *. **, 
and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5: Electoral competition and primary education II 
(Dependent variable: % of total govt spending to primary schools) 
 
 OLS 
 
(1) 
Fixed effects 
 
(2) 
IV-fixed effects 
 
(3) 
Single-party 
competition 
  1.22*** 
(0.50) 
 .901* 
(.522) 
  .857* 
(.482) 
Multiparty 
competition 
  2.14*** 
(0.38) 
.714 
(.512) 
 .905* 
(.493) 
Election year  .031 
(.326) 
.036 
(.228) 
-.010 
(.213) 
Election previous year    .801*** 
(.317) 
.159 
(.220) 
 .164 
(.202) 
Election next year    1.06*** 
(0.36) 
.378 
(.222) 
 .431** 
(.208) 
Per capita GDP (log) .317 
(.213) 
 -.741 
(.641) 
-.780 
(.591) 
Aid (%GDP)   -.171*** 
(.023) 
-.036* 
(.020) 
 -.069** 
(.031) 
Constant   6.20*** 
(2.21) 
  11.8*** 
(3.91) 
 12.3*** 
(3.63) 
N= 188 188 188 
R2 0.38 0.02 0.13 
H0:single-
party=multiparty 
p=0.04 p=0.72 p=0.92 
Overidentifying 
restrictions 
  p=0.44 
Standard errors in parentheses (panel corrected standard errors for OLS, heteroskedastic 
consistent for regressions 2 and 3.. Regression (3) instruments for Aid using first four lagged 
differences.  *. **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6: Countries included in the dataset and levels of political competition 
 
Country Year Competition Country Year Competition 
Angola 1985-87, 1990 None  Kenya 1981-91 Single Party 
Benin 1995 Multi-Party   1992-96 Multi-Party 
Botswana 1981-1996 Multi-Party  Madagascar 1981-85, 1987-
92 
Single Party 
Burkina Faso 1981-1990 None   1993 Multi-Party 
 1991-1994 Single Party  Malawi 1981-93 Single Party 
Burundi 1981, 1987-92 None   1994 Multi-Party 
 1985-86 Single Party  Mali 1981-88 Single Party 
 1994-96 Multi-Party   1995-96 Multi-Party 
Cameroon 1981-91 Single Party  Mauritania 1991 None 
Cen Afr Rep 1984-85 None   1992-95 Multi-Party 
 1986-1991 Single Party  Mozambique 1982-90 None 
Chad 1991, 1994 None  Namibia 1990-96 Multi-Party 
Congo, Dem Rep 1981-88 Single Party  Niger 1989-90 Single Party 
Congo, Rep 1981-84, 1989-
91 
None   1991-92 None 
 1992-95 Multi-Party   1993-96 Multi-Party 
Côte d’Ivoire 1992-96 Multi-Party  Nigeria 1981-83 Multi-Party 
Eq. Guinea 1988, 1993 None   1984-95 None 
Ethiopia 1983-86 None  Rwanda 1981-84, 1986-
89 
Single Party 
 1987-94 Single Party  Senegal 1981-84, 1990, 
1992-94 
Multi-Party 
 1995-96 Multi-Party  Sudan 1983-84 Single Party 
Gabon 1984-87, 1992 Single Party   1985 None 
 1994-95 Multi-Party   1986-88 Multi-Party 
Gambia 1981-85, 88, 90-
91, 93 
Multi-Party   1989-91 None 
 1994-96 None  Swaziland 1981-82, 1985-
96 
None 
Ghana 1981 Multi-Party  Togo 1981-87, 1988-
90, 1992 
Single Party 
 1984-90 None   1996 Multi-Party 
 1992-96 Multi-Party  Uganda 1984 Multi-Party 
Guinea 1988-89, 1991-
92 
None   1987, 1989-91, 
1994-95 
None 
 1993-96 Multi-Party  Zambia 1981-90 Single Party 
Guinea-Bissau 1987 Single Party   1991-95 Multi-Party 
    Zimbabwe 1981-93 Multi-Party 
 
